Intellectual capital: a Habermasian introduction

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Keywords Intellectual capital, Knowledge management

Abstract Intellectual capital creation is theorised in this conceptual paper as a dynamic process of collective knowing that is capable of being leveraged into market value. The tacit, intangible and socially unconscious nature of substantive parts of this dynamic process presents some daunting theoretical challenges. Adopting a broadly social constructionist epistemology and a pluralist ontology, the point of departure introduced here is the set of symmetric and reciprocal relations presupposed in Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action. In this worldview, interaction, as distinct from individual action, becomes the germ-cell or basic unit of theoretical analysis. The relations and validity claims built into the medium of communicative action, viewed here as the nexus of intellectual capital creation, are substantive and real phenomena; they are thus open to empirical investigation.

Communicative action refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or extra-verbal means). The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement. The central concept of interpretation refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the situation which admit of consensus (Habermas, 1984, p. 86).

Introduction
The key to competitive success in the globally networked economy is becoming the ability to visualise, create and leverage the phenomenon termed intellectual capital. This intangible is gaining ascendancy over the tangible, a fact reflected in the growing book to market ratios in knowledge intensive business sectors. In this context, intellectual capital is emerging as a highly complex and dynamic "fuzzy activity set", embracing language, experiences, history, culture, processes, understandings, interactions, interpretations, routines, information, data and knowledge. Traditional industrial era managerial paradigms, based on the tangible sources of value (land, labour and financial capital) and the predict-direct-exploit-control bureaucratic machine-metaphor are proving increasingly incapable of dealing with the emergent complexities of visualising, creating and leveraging intellectual capital.

Influenced by the seminal work of others (Alvesson, 1993; Baumard, 1999; Blackler, 1993; Bontis, 1998; Choo, 1998; Edvinsson and Sullivan, 1996; Engeström, 1987; 1990; 1994; Habermas, 1984; 1987a; 1987b; Kaplan and Norton, 1997; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Luhmann, 1990; Maturana and Varela, 1980; Nonaka, 1994; Penrose, 1959; Polanyi, 1967; Ryle, 1945; von Krogh and Roos, 1995; Saint Onge, 1996; Smith et al., 1994; Spender, 1996, 1998; Spender and Grant, 1996; Stewart, 1997; Sveiby, 1994; 1997; Vygotsky, 1962; 1978), intellectual capital creation is defined and theorised here at the interactionist...
micro-level simply as a dynamic process of collective knowing that is capable of being leveraged into market value. The partly tacit, intangible and socially unconscious nature of this dynamic process is such, moreover, that it can never be completely observed by either participants or observers.

Thomas McCarthy (1984), the heroic translator of Jürgen Habermas’ *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984; 1987a), notes that even within modern reflexivity, where the interrogation of social forms and challenges to tradition have become commonplace, people cannot step out of their lifeworlds; nor can they objectify them in a supreme act of reflection. This has decisive theoretical, methodological and practical implications for the arguments outlined here and necessitates some movement both beyond the dominant logic of positivist objectivism, to include the social and subjective worlds, and also behind the dynamic process of intellectual capital creation in attempting to identify some of the procedures necessary for it to occur. This suggests a somewhat unsettling reality that must be accepted from the outset: the intangible may never be completely accessible; the tacit may never be made completely explicit; and some of the background “knowing-how” (Ryle, 1945) in a community of practice, while somehow available to members of a specific community of practice, will always remain, to some extent, inaccessible to non-participating observers.

Further, drawing mainly on insights from Habermasian action theory (1984; 1987a; 1987b), to a significant extent from Vygotskian developmental psychology and activity theory (Blackler, 1993; Engeström, 1987; 1990; 1994; Newman and Holzman, 1993; O’Donnell and Garavan, 1997; Spender, 1998; Vygotsky, 1962; 1978) and also influenced by autopoietic epistemology (von Krogh and Roos, 1995), it is claimed that the nexus of intellectual capital creation exists in the communicative relation between people. Intellectual capital creation is thus viewed as dynamic rather than static, and as mainly a collectivist, as distinct from an individualist, phenomenon. It is discussed pragmatically here as a talking, communicating, thinking, feeling and doing dynamic process of ongoing activity that is situated and embedded within specific communities of practice. We talk mainly of knowing, or modes of knowing (Baumard, 1999; Nonaka, 1994; Spender, 1998) not knowledge; we focus on activities, not things. Practitioners and researchers trained and socialised in the individualist, cognitivist/representationist, objectivist and positivist tradition may find these strong claims somewhat difficult to come to terms with.

First, we set the stage with a brief review of existing perspectives on viewing the world and on knowing. Second, we outline the broad ontological pre-suppositions of the Habermasian communicative relation. Third, we tease out some possible implications of this approach within knowing-intensive communities of practice. We conclude that the validity claims built into the procedural aspects of the communicative relation provide a valid germ-cell or foundation for research and practice in the intellectual capital domain.
The broad context

Roos et al. (1997) note that most strategic contributions on knowledge focus on two main issues: the way knowledge is created and the way it is leveraged into value, although there is no definitive boundary between the two. The main “tool-and-result” (Vygotsky, 1978) focus in this paper is to gain some insight into the internal dynamic of the process of intellectual capital creation. An explicit focus on the intangible nature of intellectual capital creation, and on the communicative relation as its germ-cell or nexus, has profound ontological, epistemological, theoretical, empirical and practical implications for both research and business practice.

The philosophy of social science concerns itself with ontological and epistemological issues. Ontology refers to how we view the nature of the world: what kinds of phenomena exist and what are the different forms of existence? Following Habermas (1984; 1987a), we argue that the phenomenon of intellectual capital creation requires consideration of three world relations; the objective, the social and the subjective. McCarthy (1984) provides the definitive synopsis of this work (see also Burrell, 1994; Craib, 1992; Layder 1997; Outhwaite, 1994; Turner, 1991).

Our core argument is that communicative action, which encompasses all three ontological relations, is capable of providing insight into the dynamic intangible nature of intellectual capital creation. From this perspective, interaction, as distinct from individual action, becomes the basic unit of analysis. The communicative relation is our Hegelian germ-cell model. One of the best known examples of this line of dialectical thinking is Marx’s idea of commodity as the germ-cell of the capitalist socio-economic formation. Engeström (1990, p. 53) notes that:

A germ-cell must be: (a) historically the earliest, genetically the first simple form of the system; (b) logically elementary and commonplace, present in each concrete manifestation of the system; (c) internally contradictory, revealing the basic tension between the essential elements of the system, giving rise to the development and multiplication of the system. The germ-cell is a unity of opposite moments which both depend upon and rival each other. It is by working out the tensions and interactions between the elements of the system that it becomes possible to explain and foresee (its) development . . . , that is, to reconstruct it in its concrete diversity and richness.

We believe that the communicative relation between alter and ego is capable of meeting these conditions. Habermasian action theory in general, and the communicative relation in particular, provides our point of departure for gaining access to the dynamic activities highlighted by Penrose (1959) as the true drivers of organisational growth (see Leavy, 1999; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Spender, 1998).

Spender’s (1998) pluralist epistemology also provides an interesting counterpoint to the pluralist ontology outlined here, but this goes beyond the scope of this introductory discussion. Epistemology refers to the nature of an explanation: what methodology to use, what logical structure must it have, what proofs are required, or how do we know that our knowledge is knowledge
(Craib, 1992). Three broad sets of epistemologies related to intellectual capital are now evident in the literature; individualist, constructionist, and critical or alternative influences (see Blackler, 1995, Magalhães, 1998; Spender, 1998). Habermasian action theory is broadly social constructionist, eminently critical, and has received little attention to date in the emerging intellectual capital discourse.

The cognitivist-representationist school adopts a logical positivist focus on “what is”; from our philosophical and scientific worldview, the constructionist focuses on what “ought to be” (von Krogh, 1998). The theoretical challenge with intellectual capital is that we may be dealing with a phenomenon that cannot, by definition due to its intangible nature, be fully objectified. We need to start thinking about good estimates, rather than exact calculations; we need to think about facilitating this dynamic process of creation rather than the strongly directive, exploitative and controlling managerial approach of the past. Those in business must begin to accept that they do not fully know, nor can they be expected to fully know, about a lot of what is happening in their knowledge intensive organisations. How many business schools presently teach chaos theory? How many teach the basic fact that there is much that cannot be known? Not only that, but also that there is much that cannot be accurately measured or indeed precisely managed. If we adhere strictly to the illusory mantra that we must measure that which we wish to manage, then we are likely to miss out on, and perhaps remain ignorant of, or go into psychological denial with respect to, crucial aspects of this “elusive intangible”.

Autopoiesis, a term coined by Maturana and Varela (1980) to refer to the self-reproduction of living systems, has been adopted by Luhmann (1990), redefined as the internal and recursive self-reproduction of the basic elements of a social system to describe their autonomous and self-referential operations (von Krogh and Roos, 1995, 1996). Our Habermasian approach has some affinities with, but is conceptually distinct from, this autopoietic epistemology that has been introduced and applied to the intellectual capital domain in the seminal work of Georg von Krogh and Johan Roos (1995). We are in agreement with the emphasis placed by these authors on “languaging” and on communication. A broadly critical social constructionist epistemology is also adopted here, but the point of departure chosen in exploring this intellectual capital creating dynamic is the set of symmetric and reciprocal people relations presupposed in Habermas’ (1984) theory of communicative action which demands both system and lifeworld perspectives. Autopoiesis theory is a fully systems based approach. In this paper we adopt the somewhat unusual heuristic device of taking a mainly lifeworld perspective within system settings.

Habermas (1984; 1987a; 1987b) notes that in the monological, atomistic and individualistic perspective of much of modern thought and ideology since Descartes, the human being stands over against a world of objects to which it has two basic relations: representation and action. The cognitive-instrumental rationality associated with this model is one of an individual being who is capable of gaining knowledge about a contingent environment and using this
knowledge effectively by intelligently adapting to and manipulating that environment. This cognitivist perspective assumes that this (one and only objectivist) world is pre-given and that the goal of any cognitive system is to create the most accurate representation of this world. Representations (persons, things, events) can be stored in and retrieved from individual schemata, and if the events represented occur frequently they can be stored in scripts; these schemata and scripts are often referred to as knowledge structures (von Krogh and Roos, 1996). At a general level, most contributions in this vein assume that managers and organisations create representations of their environments through processing information available to them in this external environment (see Lyles and Schwenk (1992) for a seminal example). The phenomena in need of explication in intellectual capital research, however, may not be simple facets of objective nature but the inter-subjective dynamic processes of understanding and agreement at both the interpersonal and intra-psychic levels. Baumard (1999, p. 310) notes that there is no knowing “that is free from the dynamics of its own transitions and conversions”. Processes of knowing grow when they are shared (Baumard, 1999; Bontis, 1998; Nonaka, 1994; von Krogh and Roos, 1995; Spender, 1998; Sveiby, 1997), whether these be individual or collective, tacit or explicit. Knowledge workers are idea and revenue creators, not mere reified cost factors of production.

Habermas (1984; 1987a; 1987b) rejects purely monological views of rationality and meaning and proposes a more dialogic, self-reflective and inter-subjective perspective where meaning must be understood as something created between people. This shifts the focus from the dominance of individualistic cognitive-instrumental rationality to the procedural aspects of communicative rationality (the nexus of intellectual capital creation, in our opinion). Habermas (1984, p. 392) notes that:

What is paradigmatic for the latter is not the relation of a solitary subject to something in the objective world that can be represented and manipulated, but the inter-subjective relation that speaking and acting subjects take up when they come to an understanding with one another about something. In doing so, communicative actors move in the medium of a natural language, draw upon culturally transmitted interpretations, and relate simultaneously to something in the one objective world, something in their common social world, and something in each's own subjective world.

The currency of knowledge development is language; language and knowledge go hand in hand (von Krogh and Roos, 1995). Bradley (1997) notes that most approaches to packaging knowledge tend to emphasise the output of knowledge and information and pay less attention to the way it is constructed. A significant flaw in these approaches is the failure to appreciate the central importance of language as the carrier of ideologies, attitudes and knowledge, and the fact that linguistic actions play a key role in intellectual capital creation. This fact was recognised in the early 1920s in Russia in both Volosinov/Bakhtin’s work on discourse as a social process (Rice and Waugh, 1992) and by Vygotsky’s (1962; 1978) seminal work in developmental psychology. The self and the social are inextricably entwined in Vygotsky’s
cultural, historical and socially shaped theory of consciousness (surprisingly neglected by Habermas who adopts a more Piagetian perspective). With John-Christopher Spender (1998) we also view “the meaning of the term ‘the individual’ as the temporary state of a dialectical process between the privacy of our intellectual and emotional processes and the public-ness of the social processes”.

Engeström (1994), who broadly follows a Vygotskian social constructionist and activity theory tradition, notes that depth of knowledge relates to different types of practical competence within the firm. Zuboff (1988) differentiates between traditional action-centred skills and the new intellective skills demanded by advances in information technology, communications and team working. Engeström (1994) notes that the former are largely tacit, based on direct experience and difficult to communicate or codify accurately, a fact also recognised by Habermas et al. The latter are based more on collaborative analysis and exchange of symbolically mediated processes of knowing. Modes of discourse, intimately related to processes of knowing, thinking and doing, must therefore be considered. These refer to repertoires of talking, signaling, writing or generally communicating meaningfully in a community of practice. Note that Habermas refers to both verbal and extra-verbal means of communication. A gesture, a smile or a scowl often communicates meaning far better than a spoken or a written word. This dynamic process of knowing is both bodily situated and socially embedded in the interactions within a community of practice.

Ontology of the communicative relation

In this section we draw heavily on previous work on selves-directed learning and on the problem of accounting for intangible values. As the theory of communicative action establishes “an internal relation between practice and rationality” (Habermas, 1987b, p. 76), we can propose parallel relations between the orientations of intellectual capital creating people in interaction within a community of practice, and the four forms of action identified by Habermas (1984, pp. 75-101) as useful for theory construction in the social sciences. These allow us to distinguish concepts of participative social action according to how mechanisms or procedures of co-ordination are specified among the goal directed actions of people within a community of practice where intellectual capital is being created.

Teleological or goal-oriented action involves a decision based on instrumental, means-end, or purposive rationality in Max Weber’s sense. Strategic action is a variant in which an actor takes into account the likely behaviour of other goal-directed actors. This utility-maximising model of action underlies rational-choice, game-theoretic and decision-theoretic approaches in economics, sociology, social psychology and strategic management. Blossfeld (1996, p. 198), in a review of the rational-choice literature, finds that the only common denominator seems to be “a commitment to purposive individualism”, an epistemological position that social phenomena
can only be explained in terms of the intentional actions of individuals. This incomplete model also provides the foundation for neo-classical labour market theory and its human capital (Becker, 1964) derivative. Habermas stresses that although the teleological-instrumental structure is fundamental to all forms of action, it is too often taken to be the sole form of rational action in other conceptualisations of rationality, a fact he refers to as one of the great “illusions of modernity”.

Normatively-regulated action is that of members of a social group who orient their actions to common values and comply with agreed norms. Norms exist when the socially defined right to control an action is held not by an actor but by others, and when effective these norms may constitute a powerful source of collective or group value (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998), in the broadest sense of the term. Based on Goffman’s (1959) seminal work, dramaturgical action involves the conscious, face-to-face, ego-centred and social manipulation and presentation of oneself before an audience or public. Communicative action is the verbal or non-verbal interaction between two or more actors who “seek to reach an understanding about their action situation and their plans of action in order to co-ordinate their actions by way of agreement” (Habermas, 1984, p. 86). Communicative action represents a higher form of rationality in that:

Only the communicative model of action presupposes language as a medium of uncurtailed communication whereby speakers and hearers, out of the context of their pre-interpreted lifeworld, refer simultaneously to things in the objective, social, and subjective worlds in order to negotiate common definitions of the situation (Habermas, 1984, p. 95).

In communicative action participants may implicitly or explicitly raise the substantive and real validity claims of propositional truth or efficacy (objective world), normative correctness or rightness (social world), and sincerity or authenticity (subjective world). These validity claims may now be viewed as crucial to the procedural and structural aspects of the dynamic Penrosian process of intellectual capital creation (Penrose, 1959). They provide us with a potential entry point to the elusive intangible. All speech acts, however implicitly or tacitly, make these three claims, although one may be emphasised more than the other two. Validity claims raised in these forms of action relate to the three worlds to which people relate which in turn link to three relations contained in the concept of communicative rationality. These are: first, the relation of a knowing person to an objective world of events or facts; second, the relation to a social world of an acting, practical person entwined in interaction with others in a specific setting or community of practice; and finally, the relation of a suffering, passionate and emotional human being to its own internal nature, to its own subjectivity and to the subjectivity of others (Honneth et al., 1981). These are substantive and ontologically very real social phenomena: they are thus open to empirical investigation. Using the construct “critical appraisal norms” as the foundation for empirical work, the validity claims within the communicative relation can be investigated and implications for practice can be thought out, teased out and tested. Claims in an ideal
instance are not settled by recourse to power or authority, but by providing reasons for or against in the mutual give-and-take of this higher rational argumentative discourse, although human reason must also learn to recognise the limits of its power over the phenomenal and interpersonal worlds.

As we are analysing an essentially lifeworld concept within system settings such as knowledge intensive organisations, issues related to the systemic steering media of money and power must of course be pragmatically considered in any empirical investigations or practical applications. Acknowledging Habermas’ (1987a, p. 311) argument that inner-organisational relations “disempower” the “validity basis” of communicative action due to the systemic aspect of legal organisation, a pragmatic approach is suggested here in investigating the usefulness of this discourse-theoretic analytic in general, and of the validity claims inherent in processes of communicative action in particular, for theory construction, empirical work, and practical applications in the intellectual capital domain. The employment relation is, by it very nature, an asymmetric relation; but perhaps it needs to become less asymmetric in the intellectual capital era? In this pragmatic introduction, we claim only that valuable insights may be gained from this Habermasian approach, and we seek to encourage others to join us in exploring this albeit critical and alternative, but potentially valuable, theoretical vein.

Lifeworld in system
This process of differentiated worldviews takes place in or against the set of background assumptions and stocks of knowing of specific communities of practice. This orientation of communicative action to validity claims admitting of argument and counter-argument is the central germ-cell core that may make dynamic Penrosian processes of intellectual capital creation (Penrose, 1959) possible at the micro and interactionist level of analysis. This lifeworld “stands behind the back” of people in communication within a community of practice out of which the process of mutual understanding is supported through the procedural aspects of grounding criticisable validity claims in context. Members of a social collective normally share a lifeworld that only exists in a “uniquely pre-reflexive form of background assumptions, background receptivities or background relations” (Honneth et al., 1981, p. 16). Parsons’ (1951) tricothomy of culture, society and personality is linked by Habermas into the processes of interaction within a lifeworld that must be conceived of as a “culturally transmitted and linguistically organised stock of interpretative patterns” (1987a, p. 124). Adopting and adapting Habermasian terminology in a heuristic manner, that is, by viewing an essentially system setting from a lifeworld perspective, we can very tentatively suggest the following.

The structural components of a specific organisational lifeworld (language, culture, community of practice, selves) meet corresponding needs of the specific lifeworld (cultural reproduction, social integration, socialisation and selves-development) through three dimensions along which communicative action is
conducted (reaching understanding, co-ordinating interaction, effecting socialisation) which in turn are rooted in the structural components (propositional, illocutionary, expressive) of everyday speech acts (see Table I).

All elements of the matrix are fragile, but it provides a potentially interesting and novel way of thinking about, investigating and perhaps facilitating knowing-intensive life and work. A disturbance in any element of the matrix may disrupt the fragile, collectivist and intangible nature of the dynamic process of intellectual capital creation. We do not go into the implications of this Habermasian matrix in any detail here. Our intention is merely to demonstrate the potential theoretical and practical power of the systemic approaches that can be built from the germ-cell of the communicative relation.

Following Habermas, and the developmental psychology of the Vygotskian and activity theory school, one can claim that a universal property of communities of practice is that their exchange with their environments involves both production and socialisation, and that learning in both dimensions (production and socialisation) determines their level of development. Two features of this collective learning process may be viewed as central: first, whether learning is reflexive, that is, involving the discursive thematisation of validity claims; and second, whether theoretical and moral-practical questions are differentiated. Communities of practice can be viewed as reflexive learning systems where the contents of traditions, institutions, task procedures and processes of socialisation become increasingly subject to reflection and critical analysis (see also Beck et al., 1994; Swift and West, 1998). This is suggestive of the idea of communicative rationality as an organising principle for knowing-intensive work within communities of practice in an era of growing uncertainty, ambiguity and contingency.

From a resource-based perspective (Barney, 1991; Conner 1991; Flood et al., 1995; Wernerfelt, 1984; Wright et al., 1994), if the architecture of this intellectual capital creation, transformation and value leveraging process is configured in ways that are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (and collective

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<th>Reproduction processes</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Community of practice</th>
<th>Selves</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural reproduction</td>
<td>Interpretative schemata fit for consensus (valid knowing)</td>
<td>Legitimations</td>
<td>Behaviour patterns effective in selves-development; learning goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social integration</td>
<td>Obligations</td>
<td>Legitimately ordered interpersonal relations</td>
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<td>Socialisation</td>
<td>Interpretative accomplishments</td>
<td>Motivations for actions that conform to norms</td>
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**Source:** Adapted from Habermas (1987a, p. 142)
processes of tacit knowing are about as complex, specific, inimitable and unique as one can find) then it may represent a potential organic source of sustainable competitive advantage. This “architectural” argument is also capable of expansion to a regional or societal level (see Ashton and Green, 1996; Maurice et al., 1986). Spender (1998), however, suggests a move away from this form of thinking:

To treat knowledge as a mere asset, a static entity like any other of the firm’s constituting elements or factors of production, is to miss the opportunity to shift our theorising into a genuinely dynamic framework. In the static framework dictated by positivism’s monist epistemology a knowledge-based theory is more or less the same as a resource-based theory. But in a dynamic framework they differ because knowledge and learning imply processes within us rather than changes in the entities making up the world out there. Thus a knowledge-based theory should have the capability to handle a shift of analytic focus from the firm’s intangible knowledge assets onto the processes that generate, distribute and apply them. Managers, of course, shape the organisation’s learning processes more directly than they shape its products.

This is broadly in line with what we have tried to do here by focusing on these dynamic Penrosian processes via the validity claims inherent in Habermas’ concept of communicative action. We further note an emerging focus on issues of care (McGovern, 1999; von Krogh, 1998), commitment (Baumard, 1999) and trust (Barney and Hansen, 1994; Huemer et al., 1998; Lazaric and Lorenz, 1998; Mishira, 1996; Misztal, 1996) as distinct from the traditional industrial-era managerial paradigm founded on opportunism, distrust and control. Such shifts in perspective, added to the increasing economic relevance of the intangible, almost certainly necessitate developments in both agency and transaction cost theory (as developed from the works of Coase (1937); Arrow (1974); Jensen and Meckling (1976); Williamson (1981)). This is suggestive of some profound economic, managerial, psychological, and sociological implications for both structuring and facilitating the employment relation and collective learning processes in a business environment where the main strategic activity is intellectual capital creation.

**Conclusion**

Communicative action theory provides an ontological and epistemological foundation that has yet to be adequately developed in intellectual capital research. The dynamic intellectual capital creating Penrosian process of knowing that can be leveraged into market value is viewed here as existing in the germ-cell of the communicative relation. Through communicative processes people continuously learn, develop, unlearn, relearn and apply common understandings by which to exchange, combine, create, renew and transfer tacit, implicit, explicit and codified processes of knowing from blueprints, ideas, emotional states and fuzzy hunches into problem definitions, solutions, added value and markets in lifeworlds of ongoing uncertainty, ambiguity and contingency. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) cite Penrose’s (1959, p. 53) observation that such experience:
develops an increasing knowledge of the possibilities for action and the ways in which
to take by the firm. This increase in knowledge not only causes the productive
t of a firm to change but also contributes to the “uniqueness” of the opportunity
of each individual firm.

Human beings create intellectual capital; technology and money are merely the
tools that people use. The universal communicative relation between human
beings, which satisfies the scientific requirements of objectivity in a specific
sense (Habermas, 1984, p. 137), has been presented here as the germ-cell of
intellectual capital creation. Habermasian action theory in general, and the
communicative relation in particular, provide, we believe, valid points of
departure for gaining access to the dynamic drivers of organisational growth.

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